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Intro -- Blackwell Companions to Philosophy -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Notes on Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: Characterizing Relativism -- 1 Global Relativism and Self-Refutation -- 1. Self-Refutation -- 2. Defining Relativism about a Feature F -- 3. Relativism about Truth -- 4. Defining Global Relativism -- 5. Difficulties with Unrestricted Global Relativism -- 6. Difficulties with Global Indexical Relativism -- 7. Applying Global Relativism to Itself -- 8. Self-Refutation Again -- 2 Relativism Requires Alternatives, Not Disagreement or Relative Truth -- 1. Two Intuitions Underlying a Consensus on Relativism -- 2. The Real Dividing Issue: Is the World One or Many? -- 3. Disagreement and Relative Truth -- 3 Three Kinds of Relativism -- 1. Thoroughgoing Relativism -- 2. Alethic Relativism -- 3. Absolutist Relativism -- 4 Varieties of Relativism and the Reach of Reasons -- 1. Definition -- 2. General Contrasts between Relativism and Absolutism -- 3. Reference Frames -- 4. Domains -- 5. Levels -- 6. Values -- 7. Absolutist Strands a Relativist Might Negate -- 8. On the Putative Self-Contradiction of Relativism -- 9. Reach of Reasons -- 10. Conclusion -- Part II: Truth and Language -- 5 Truth Relativism and Truth Pluralism -- Introduction -- 1. Truth Relativism -- 2. Metaphysics of Truth Relativism -- 3. Truth Relativism and the Scope Problem -- 4. Truth Pluralism -- 5. Example: Relative Moral Truth -- 6. Conclusion -- 6 The Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond -- Introduction -- 1. Relativism and Apparent Faultless Disagreement -- 2. The Many Relativisms: Moderate vs. Radical -- 3. Moderate Relativisms: Indexical vs. Non-indexical Contextualism -- 4. Radical Relativism: Content vs. Truth Relativism -- 5. The Many "Relativism"s -- 7 Variation in Intuitions about Reference and Ontological Disagreements.